| State v. Raymond Tison
(Raymond Tison I), 129 Ariz. 546, 633 P.2d 355 (1981) PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant was
convicted in Superior Court (Yuma) of four counts of first-degree murder, three counts of
kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and theft of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to
death on the murder counts. This is his automatic, direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme
Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(1) (Prior Life or Death Felony) - DISCUSSED
See discussion in Ricky Tison I, 129 Ariz. 526, 633 P.2d 335 (1981).
(F)(2) (Prior Violent Felony) - DISCUSSED
See discussion in Ricky Tison I, 129 Ariz. 526, 633 P.2d 335 (1981).
(F)(3) (Grave Risk of Death to Others) - REVERSED
Because the four victims who were in the car the defendants wanted to steal to
continue their escape from prison were "ruthlessly and intentionally murdered,"
this aggravating circumstance did not exist, even though some of the victims had been
close enough physically so that each murder put others in a grave risk of danger.
(F)(5) (Pecuniary Gain) - UPHELD
The victims were found in and around the car that the defendant and his
companions used to assist in the escape of the defendant's father and Randy Greenawalt
from the Arizona State Prison. After they abandoned that car, the defendant and his
companions left the scene of the murders in the victims' automobiles. "Considering
all the facts, the conclusion is justified that the homicides were committed to secure a
vehicle with which to continue their flight." The Court concluded that this
aggravating circumstance was "clearly established."
(F)(6) (Heinous, Cruel or Depraved) - UPHELD
Cruel: Not addressed
Heinous and Depraved: Upheld.
Senselessness: Found. The Court found these murders to be heinous and
depraved because of the senselessness of the murders, the inability of the victims to stop
the escape in such an isolated area, and the fact that a 22-month-old child who posed no
threat to the captors was shot in the arms of his mother. There were less violent
alternatives available to prevent the captors' detection by the authorities than to
slaughter the entire family. These actions compel the conclusion that the slayers had a
shockingly evil state of mind.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
The Court found that the following mitigating circumstances
existed, but were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency:
Age
Felony Murder conviction
Lack of Criminal History
The Court found that the defendant failed to prove the
existence of the following as mitigating circumstances:
(G)(2) Duress
(G)(3) Minor Participation
JUDGMENT: Convictions and sentences
affirmed.
State v. Schad (Schad I),
129 Ariz. 557, 633 P.2d 366 (1981)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Yavapai) of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
This is his automatic, direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(1) (Prior Life or Death Felony) - UPHELD
The defendant was previously convicted of second-degree murder, which was
sufficient to support the (F)(1) finding.
(F)(2) (Prior Violent Felony) - UPHELD
The defendant was previously convicted of second-degree murder where the victim
was strangled. This conviction was sufficient to support the (F)(2) finding.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
The trial court found the fact that the defendant was a model
prisoner was a mitigating circumstance, but the Court agreed that it was not
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
The Court found that the defendant failed to prove the
existence of the following as mitigating circumstances:
Residual doubt
Lack of intent to kill
JUDGMENT: Conviction and sentence
affirmed.
State v. Britson, 130
Ariz. 380, 636 P.2d 628 (1981)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Pima) of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed
kidnapping. He was sentenced to death for the murder. After a hearing on a petition for
post-conviction relief, the defendant was again sentenced to death. This is his automatic,
direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(2) (Prior Violent Felony) - UPHELD
Prior out of state convictions for aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon,
attempted murder, and aggravated battery were sufficient to support trial court's
(F)(2)
finding.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
None sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The
Court found that the defendant failed to prove the existence of the following as
mitigating circumstances:
(G)(1) Significant impairment - Alcohol or
drugs [intoxication]
Victim's actions [classic lover's triangle and victim had knife]
Sufficiency of evidence [conviction based on testimony of wife who hated
him]
JUDGMENT: Conviction and death
sentence affirmed.
State v. Rumsey (Rumsey
I), 130 Ariz. 427, 636 P.2d 1209 (1981)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Maricopa) of first- degree murder and armed robbery. He
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years
on the murder conviction and to twenty-one years on the armed robbery conviction to be
served consecutively. This is his appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(5) (Pecuniary Gain) - DISCUSSED
The trial court did not believe the (F)(5) pecuniary gain finding applied to
situations other than contract killings based on State v. Madsen, 125 Ariz. 346,
609 P.2d 1046 (1980). When the defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, the State
cross-appealed on this issue. Madsen was the law when this defendant was
sentenced. However, only three months later, the Arizona Supreme Court clarified the issue
in State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 616 P.2d 888 (1980), and expanded the
interpretation of the pecuniary gain aggravator to situations other than contract killing
cases. Because the trial court erred in concluding that it could not find that the murder
here was committed for monetary gain as a matter of law, the case was sent back to the
trial court for resentencing. The facts here were that the victim picked up the defendant
and witness who were hitchhiking somewhere in New Mexico or Texas. In Phoenix, the victim
bought beer and food for the defendant and witness. The witness testified that the
defendant noticed that the victim had over $300 in his wallet, and he was going to rob the
victim. The defendant ordered the victim into the trunk of the victim's car, and when the
victim refused, shot the victim. Then the defendant dragged the victim off the road and
threw some money at the witness.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
No discussion of mitigating circumstances in this opinion.
JUDGMENT: Convictions affirmed and
armed robbery sentence affirmed. Life sentence for the murder conviction vacated, and
remanded for resentencing. [Chief Justice Struckmeyer dissented from this opinion arguing
that the life sentence should be affirmed where, as here, a resentencing opens the
possibility that the death penalty could be imposed. He maintained that permitting a
possible resentence of death where the State cross-appeals will have a chilling effect on
a defendant with a life sentence and a meritorious appeal.]. On resentencing, the
defendant was given the death sentence. On appeal from that resentencing, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that because the defendant was originally given a sentence of life
imprisonment, he could not constitutionally be given the death penalty at resentencing.
The original sentence of life imprisonment operated as an acquittal of the death penalty. State
v. Rumsey (Rumsey II), 136 Ariz. 166, 665 P.2d 48 (1983).
State v. Joseph Smith
(Joseph Smith II), 131 Ariz. 29, 638 P.2d 696 (1982)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Maricopa) of two counts of first-degree murder and was
sentenced to death on each of the murder counts. The Arizona Supreme Court remanded for
resentencing pursuant to State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978),
and the trial court again imposed the death penalty. This is the defendant's automatic,
direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(1) (Prior Life or Death Felony) - UPHELD
Prior convictions for rape, rape in the first degree, and murder in the first
degree were sufficient to support the (F)(1) finding. The defendant was sentenced to death
on each of the murder counts in this case, and the finding of a prior conviction of murder
was based, as to each victim, on the murder of the other victim.
(F)(2) (Prior Violent Felony) - UPHELD
Prior convictions for rape, rape in the first degree, and murder in the first
degree were sufficient to support the (F)(2) finding. The defendant was sentenced to death
on each of the murder counts in this case, and the finding of a prior conviction of murder
was based, as to each victim, on the murder of the other victim.
(F)(6) (Heinous, Cruel or Depraved) - UPHELD
Cruel: Upheld. As to one of the victims,
Neva Lee, the trial court found that she had been murdered by forcing dirt into her mouth
and upper respiratory system and died of suffocation. She also suffered a stab wound near
her vagina and tears to her vaginal area. For victim Sandy Spencer, the trial court
determined that she died of suffocation just like Ms. Lee, and suffered 19 to 20 stab
wounds to her groin and pelvic area. There was also a sewing needle embedded in her left
breast.
Heinous and Depraved: Not addressed.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
None. The Court found that the defendant failed to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the existence of the (G)(1) mitigating circumstance, or
any mental impairment at all.
JUDGMENT: Convictions and sentences
affirmed.
State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz.
195, 639 P.2d 1020 (1982)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Pima) of first-degree murder, three counts of attempted
first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, arson of an occupied structure,
first-degree burglary, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The defendant was
sentenced to death on the murder count. This is his automatic, direct appeal to the
Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(1) (Prior Life or Death Felony) - REVERSED
The basis for finding this aggravating circumstance was a conspiracy conviction
entered at the same time as the murder conviction. The Court reversed the (F)(1) finding,
stating that "a prior conviction must be entered prior to the time for which jeopardy
attaches on the first-degree murder charge." Note: Subsequently, in State
v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 57 n.2 (1983), the Court explained this decision. The
Court stated that convictions entered prior to a sentencing hearing may be considered
regardless of the order in which the underlying crimes occurred, or the order in which the
convictions were entered. To the extent any language in Ortiz suggests the
contrary, it is disapproved. In Ortiz, "the trial court erred in considering
a contemporaneous conviction for conspiracy to commit murder as aggravation for the
murder. This exclusion from consideration is best understood as having been required
because both convictions arose out of the same set of events."
(F)(3) (Grave Risk of Death to Others) - UPHELD
The defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to three children when he
tried to dispose of their mother's body by burning down the house with all four people
inside. He stabbed two of the children and told all three to remain in the house until the
fire department arrived. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that, as a matter of
law, once the murder victim is dead, nothing the murderer does thereafter can be
considered part of the "commission of the offense" within the meaning of
(F)(3).
(F)(6) (Heinous, Cruel or Depraved) - UPHELD
Cruel: Reversed. The Court disagreed with
the trial court that this crime was especially cruel because the state could not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered during the commission of the murder.
The victim was stabbed many times, may have been strangled, and was set on fire by the
defendant.
Heinous and Depraved: Upheld. The Court
upheld this finding without discussion, but it appears that gratuitous violence may have
been the basis for the finding. The victim was stabbed, may have been strangled, and was
set on fire by the defendant. He then stabbed the victim's two young daughters and tried
to set the house on fire. The two girls and the baby were able to escape. The Court found
this murder to be "far more heinous and depraved than the norm of first-degree
murders."
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
None sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The
Court noted that the trial court found the following were not mitigating circumstances
under the facts of this case:
Mental impairment - [ability to distinguish right
from wrong]; Duress; Lack of intent to kill; Length of jury deliberations; Lack of
criminal history; Intelligence; Good character; Good behavior in jail; and Likelihood of
recidivism
JUDGMENT: Convictions and sentences
affirmed.
State v. Blazak (Blazak
II), 131 Ariz. 598, 643 P.2d 694 (1982)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of assault with intent to
commit murder, and one count of attempted armed robbery, and was sentenced to death on the
murder counts. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Blazak I, 114 Ariz. 199, 560 P.2d 54 (1977). The Court ordered a resentencing,
pursuant to State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), and the
defendant was again sentenced to death. The defendant unsuccessfully sought
post-conviction relief. This is the defendant's automatic, direct appeal to the Arizona
Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(1) (Prior Life or Death Felony) - UPHELD
This aggravating circumstance was upheld without discussion. The trial court
based its (F)(1) finding on prior convictions for robbery and assault with intent to
commit murder.
(F)(2) (Prior Violent Felony) - UPHELD
This aggravating circumstance was upheld without discussion. The finding was
based on the prior convictions for robbery and assault with intent to commit murder.
(F)(3) (Grave Risk of Death to Others) - UPHELD
The (F)(3) finding was upheld without any analysis. The defendant, while armed
and wearing a ski mask, attempted to rob the bartender of the Brown Fox Tavern in Tucson.
When the bartender refused to give him money, the defendant shot both him and a patron
seated nearby. A third person was also wounded. The Court concluded that based on these
facts, this murder constituted a grave risk to others in the bar at the time of the
shooting.
(F)(5) (Pecuniary Gain) - UPHELD
The (F)(5) finding was upheld without extensive discussion. The facts supporting
the finding are that Blazak attempted to rob the Brown Fox Tavern in Tucson. When the
bartender refused to surrender his money, Blazak shot and killed him and a patron sitting
nearby, then fled with an accomplice.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
There is no discussion of mitigating circumstances in this
opinion. It is unclear what mitigation evidence, if any, was presented by the defendant.
But the Court rejected the arguments made by the defendant in the context of a speedy
trial type right in capital sentencing - the prejudices inherent in presenting mitigation
evidence years after the crime, and oppression from receiving a second death sentence.
JUDGMENT: Death sentence affirmed.
State v. Valencia
(Valencia III), 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Pima) of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The
Arizona Supreme Court remanded for resentencing, in Valencia I, 121 Ariz. 191,
589 P.2d 434 (1979), pursuant to State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253
(1978). The trial court again imposed the death penalty and the defendant appealed. The
Arizona Supreme Court again remanded for resentencing before a different judge because the
trial judge had spoken with the victim's family regarding the family's wishes regarding
the death penalty. Valencia II, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 (1979). On remand,
the defendant was again sentenced to death. This is his automatic, direct appeal from that
second resentencing.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(1) (Prior Life or Death Felony) - UPHELD
Prior convictions in Arizona of rape, kidnapping, and robbery were sufficient to
support the (F)(1) finding.
(F)(2) (Prior Violent Felony) - UPHELD
Prior convictions in Arizona of rape, kidnapping, and robbery were sufficient to
support the (F)(2) finding.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
The Court found the defendant's young age (16 years old at
the time of the murder) a substantial and relevant factor that must be given "great
weight."
JUDGMENT: The defendant's sentence
was reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years,
to be served consecutively to the forty to sixty year sentence on his rape conviction.
This reduction was based on the defendant's young age, sixteen, at the time of the murder.
State v. Michael
and Patrick Poland (Poland I), 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendants
were convicted in Superior Court (Yavapai) of first-degree murder and were sentenced to
death. This is the defendants' automatic, direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(5) (Pecuniary Gain) - DISCUSSED
The trial court thought that the (F)(5) aggravating factor applied only to murder
for hire situations, and therefore, did not find this factor proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. After the trial in this case, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Clark,
holding that the (F)(5) pecuniary gain factor was not limited to murder for hire
situations. Since the defendants received $281,000 in cash from the Purolator van after
drowning the two guards, the Court here stated that the trial court could find the
existence of the (F)(5) aggravating circumstance on retrial of the case.
(F)(6) (Heinous, Cruel or Depraved) - REVERSED
The Court restated the definitions of the terms "especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved," as set forth in State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704
(1977). The Court reaffirmed that cruelty consists of mental and physical pain inflicted
on the victim, whereas heinousness and depravity focus on the mental state and attitude of
the defendant as shown by his actions or words. 132 Ariz. at 285.
Cruel: Reversed.
Mental Anguish: Not addressed.
Physical Pain: Not found. No evidence of suffering by the security guard victims.
No evidence that the guards had been "bound or injured prior to being placed in the
water and there were no signs of a struggle."
Heinous or Depraved: Reversed. The Court
noted that this finding focuses on the state of mind of the defendants and, although their
state of mind may be inferred from their behavior, "we know nothing of the
circumstances under which the guards were held hostage." The state failed to prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were committed in an `especially heinous,
cruel or depraved manner.'" 132 Ariz. at 285.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
There is no discussion of mitigating circumstances in this
opinion.
JUDGMENT: Convictions reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
State v. Woratzeck, 134
Ariz. 452, 657 P.2d 865 (1983)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The defendant
was convicted in Superior Court (Pinal) of first-degree murder, armed robbery and burglary
of residential structure and was sentenced to death for the murder. This is his automatic,
direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(5) (Pecuniary Gain) - UPHELD
The defendant killed Linda Louise Leslie, a 36-year old with the mental capacity
of a 15-year old, who lived in a shed rented from the defendant and attached to his
trailer. The defendant also robbed Leslie of approximately $107.00. In addition to the
fact that the jury found defendant guilty of the robbery of Leslie, there was evidence
that the defendant had been without money shortly before the murder. Witnesses testified
that he had to borrow money to buy beer at a bar earlier on the evening of the murder.
After the murder, the defendant had a sum of money almost identical to that taken from
Leslie. The defendant's story that he won the money playing pool at the bar the previous
evening was disputed by witnesses who said it would have been impossible to win that much
money playing pool at that bar because any betting was always for small change.
(F)(6) (Heinous, Cruel or Depraved) - UPHELD
Cruel: Reversed. The Court found the
evidence inconclusive as to whether the victim suffered in such a way as to support a
cruelty finding. However, the Court reiterated the pathologist's testimony that the blows
to the head were inflicted last and were the cause of death. The victim was also strangled
and stabbed three times in the chest before she suffered the two blows to the head. The
victim suffered from Huntington's disease and had the mental capacity of a
fifteen-year-old.
Heinous or Depraved: Upheld
Gratuitous Violence: Found. The violence committed against the victim
was well beyond the point necessary to fulfill a plan to steal or even to kill. The victim
suffered from Huntington's disease, lacked coordination, and had the mental capacity of a
fifteen-year-old. She had been strangled, stabbed three time, struck on the head twice,
and her house and body burned.
Helplessness: Found. The murder was heinous or depraved in part because the
victim was physically helpless. The victim had Huntington's disease, lacked coordination,
and had the mental capacity of a fifteen-year-old. The Court found that during the attack
she would have most likely not understood what was happening and would have been
physically helpless.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
The Court found that the defendant failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the following mitigating circumstance:
(G)(1) - Significant impairment - [by intoxication]
JUDGMENT: Conviction and death
sentence affirmed.
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